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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Better rule of law would generate economic growth, which would in turn build 
constituencies for democratic reforms [Root and May (2006)]. Consider prisoners 
dilemma, to Law and Economics Scholars, the inevitability of prisoner’s dilemmas 
arising to block potentially efficient exchanges explains the need for and consequently 
the adoption of contract law. When the law enforces contracts, it permits the participants 
in a potential prisoners’ dilemma the option of escaping the dominant strategy 
equilibrium of non-cooperation, which prevents the achievement of efficient exchanges, 
by permitting the parties to effectively pre-commit to future cooperative behavior. Mutual 
pre-commitments can produce the efficient cooperate-cooperate equilibrium. The 
existence of contract law then tends to foster efficient cooperative behaviour.  
Institutions are considered to provide the mechanisms by which individuals can 
resolve social dilemmas [Steins (1999)]. They are sets of rules that people have created in 
order to control/regulate the behavior of people using a natural resource. Several layers of 
institutions are important for institutional development and economic performance. These 
layers, from the slowest moving to the fastest moving are: human motivations and social 
institutions, political institutions, legal institutions and private institutions [Azfar (2006)]. 
Institutions perform their role to frame rules, procedure and enabling environment 
for implementation of rules. Rights of individuals are recognised and recognised through 
institutions as well. 
According to Wikipedia, Coase theorem, attributed to Ronald Coase, relates to the 
economic efficiency of a government’s allocation of property rights. In essence, the 
theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs, all government allocations of 
property rights are equally efficient, because interested parties will bargain privately to 
correct any externality. The transaction costs and other inefficiencies might lead to 
reduction of natural bargains, thereby lead to inefficient allocation of resources, e.g. in  
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Pakistan every lease agreement beyond one year must be registered and stamped leads to 
lessor and lessee agreeing a lease agreement of 11 months or stay unregistered [Rafay 
(2006)]. This creates hidden economy as well as leaves rights unprotected in case of a 
conflict. Enforcement mechanism is weak, for instance a person executing unregistered 
legal instrument would be charged with only Rs 500 and the instrument would not be 
canceled thereto as well [Alam (2006)], which further suggests that it does not create a 
transaction cost to deter some bargains at all, while on the other hand mandatory 
registration requirements for any immovable property bargain is one such cost. Further 
the complexities, cumbersomeness and documentation requirements over and above those 
which are of a particular law binding create the transactional inefficiencies.  
Contradicting legal practices based on type of presentation made also create a 
threat of rights violation to the bargainer as well as create the unidentified economic 
activity. The difference between definition of a Sale defined in Islamic Law differ 
slightly from the requirements of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 but in certain cases 
its more, e.g. in the case of law relating to pre-emption [Alam (2006)].   
2.  NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE LAWS 
Land being a fix supply natural resource and a fundamental factor for firm and 
household level production function requires a comprehensive short run and dynamic 
allocation mechanism. This would ensure its optimal utilisation, sustainability and adding 
value to the wellbeing of its users. In the broader perspective it encompasses factors such 
as optimality in usage, equity, sustainability and economies of scale. As this factor has 
multifaceted usage and in each of its dimensions requires a judicious use. E.g. from the 
property rights perspective it’s an individual good, from the provision of a park or a 
recreational place makes it a public good etc. From the public ownership to the private, 
directed to the undirected, tenure based provision to the forever ownership makes it a 
complex object which requires a dynamic law for its optimal usage. 
In the absence of the protection of property rights, many exchanges would not take 
place which are necessary and sufficient condition for welfare models and thereby 
markets would remain primitive and stunted. Reliable law enforcement is an important, 
indeed essential, public good that the state must provide to encourage economic 
development [Azfar (2006)]. Such a rule of law where rights and privileges of merchants 
and other citizens are clearly defined, impartially interpreted, and consistently enforced is 
important to facilitate economic activity.  
Few of the Studies focusing on Interaction of law and economics is based on the 
human relationship. Although, Economists, who regard equilibria as self-sustaining, have 
easily concluded that equilibrium conditions in relationships will be self-enforcing and 
thus create “rights” among the relating parties which exist independently of any 
exogenous legal entitlements and the law does not attempt to intervene in ongoing 
relationships except to terminate them [Bowes and Bigelow (1996)]. In presence of rules 
of game such an equilibrium may easily be reached by players. But absence of rules of 
the game may affect overall efficiency of the system otherwise.  
Role of judicial system is an important element in implementation of laws. It 
depends on how courts are used; it can be used to protect wealth rather than to protect 
competition and innovation or the governments may employ courts to improve contract 
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enforcement, loan repayment and bureaucratic discipline and still not allow citizens the 
right to assemble, mobilize and organise for political purposes [Root and May (2006)]. 
Political institutions consist of the methods of selecting the government. A 
growing consensus in recent years suggests that this is because in many underdeveloped 
countries, privileged elite maintain their rents by forcing suboptimal policies on the rest 
of the population through oppressive political institutions [Rajan (2006)]. Initial 
inequality in endowments and opportunities can create constituencies that support bad 
policies which reproduce those initial constituencies over time.  
New Institutional Economics (NIE) proposes clear property rights which give 
private agents sharp incentives to minimise on costs while maintaining quality. In the 
private economic sphere, collateral laws that clearly state creditors should be paid back in 
the order in which they lent may help improve the functioning of debt markets. Further 
there exists a need for ensuring a system of law enforcement commensurate with the 
requirements of self-sustained economic growth [Haq (2006)]. 
Business surveys based on investor perceptions typically correlate judicial reforms 
as a positive step towards advancing political stability and political opening [Root and 
May (2006)]. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) talks of governance and economic 
growth. While elaborating NIE Azfar (2006) used four subject; finance and development, 
education reform, decentralisation and the delivery of foreign assistance and concluded 
that each of them can be analysed in the NIE perspective. Political institutions and social 
structure affects laws like commercial laws and their enforcement hence affecting the 
debt and equity markets. Decentralisation and local institutions with reference public 
service delivery and accountability are also one of the core areas under the NIE.   
3.  INCOMPATIBILITY OF FEDERAL LAND REVENUE LAWS 
The constitution of Pakistan seeks to promote well being of the people and protect 
economic life of Pakistan by conferring fundamental rights, including economic rights 
and then protecting them by declaring laws inconsistent with them to be void [Hassan 
(2006)]. Law endows certain rights to individuals engaged in economic transactions, but 
if these entitlements1 are not beyond those they can self-enforce, that such exogenous law 
would be ineffectual, or enforce “Unenforceability Hypothesis”.  The Objectives 
resolution, now part of the constitution of 1973,  inter alia, established the guarantee  of 
accession for fundamental rights, equality of status and opportunity before law, social, 
economic and political justice [Hassan (2006)].  
Well established property rights are pre-requisite for establishment of a market 
economy. In the property rights theory the main focus is not so much on the different 
owner positions, but more on the conventional fourfold distinction of property right 
regimes. Cole (2002) documents following property rights: 
State Property. Individuals have a duty to observe use/access rules determined by 
a controlling/managing agency. Agencies have a power to determine use/access rules. 
Private Property. Individuals have a privilege (reinforced with claim rights) to 
undertake socially acceptable uses, and have a duty to refrain from socially unacceptable 
uses. Others (called ‘non owners’) have a duty not to prevent socially acceptable uses, 
and have a claim that only socially acceptable uses will occur.  
1See Annexure 2 for details on bundle of rights. 
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Common Property. The management group (the ‘owners’) has a power to 
exclude nonmembers, and nonmembers have a duty to abide by such exclusion. 
Individual members of the management group (the ‘co-owners’) have both powers and 
claims-duties with respect to the user rates and maintenance of the object owned. 
Non-property. There is no defined group of users or ‘owners’ and the benefit 
stream are available to anyone. Individuals have both a privilege and a no claim with 
respect to use rates and maintenance of the asset. The asset is an ‘open-access resource’. 
Most economists would say that resources should be regulated by assigning one of 
these property right regimes. 
Land revenue system in Pakistan has many ambiguities that land records do not 
reflect exact rights and interests of concerned parties to engage in bargains of immovable 
property, and lack of conceptual clarity. Overlapping laws creates an uncertainty and a 
setback to potential transactions of land. 
A number of ambiguities in revenue laws are related to its property rights 
mentioned under following categories: 
(1) Khana Milkiat. 
(2) Khana Kasht. 
(3) Abadi Deh. 
(4) Shamlat and different kinds of shamlat. 
(5) Private path and public path/shara-i-aam.  
Strengthening of property rights and the expansion of competition and 
associated opportunities will help the very poor but with it endowments like 
education development is necessary [Rajan (2006)]. Describing the Taxonomy of 
land records, Khan (2006) identified that the system of land records are 5 centuries 
old, there is no single agency to coordinate titles or registration and state does not 
guarantee land titles. The formed rules are not being practiced and there is too much 
flexibility in the transfer of owner ship of land title (more than hundred). There is 
Qabza group and military interests in real estates. 
Similarly overlapping property rights due to columns of holding as section 4 of 
Land Revenue Act 1967 states; “Word ‘Holding’ meaning of vernacular equivalent 
of term ‘Holding’ is Khewat and tenants’ holding is called ‘Khatooni’ or ‘Khata’. 
Word ‘Khata’ some times is loosely applied to owner’s holding as well as tenant’s 
holding. Tenant’s holding is technically called ‘tenancy’ PLD 1984 SC (AJ&K) 38 
PSC 1984.  
From the analysis of old and uncorrected ownership record of 1970s revealed that 
Khawat or Khata have lost their utility due to multiple distributions. Kind of property 
reflected through number Khasra is converted from rural/agriculture into semi-rural, 
urban and sub-urban. Mere entry in revenue record cannot be accepted as a sufficient 
proof of ownership rather the entry has to be interpreted in the light of other facts and 
circumstances of given case of CLC (1982), page 1309. Contract between proprietary 
body and non proprietary body of village are mentioned in CLC (1989), page 2148, 
Shariat-i-Wajibul Arz.  
The old revenue laws are insufficient to cater for current needs of ownership of 
land in prevailing circumstances due to following reasons: 
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(1) Size of land is same while population has increased many folds. In words 
demand has increased against constant supply (as land being a fixed supply 
resource). 
(2) Old social system comprising close society and tribal system has evaded. The 
old social system was a check on violation of ownership rights.  
(3) Social changes in the society have changed preferences of individuals. They 
prefer monetary interests over social values. Marginal utility of money is 
higher relative to marginal utility of social values. 
(4) System governance is insufficient to strengthen property rights. A number of 
agents are involved in the system including revenue, police officials and 
politician. Due to heterogeneous and confusing roles and functions, it leads to 
weaken title of ownership. 
(5) Escalating prices of land have increased value of marginal utility of land to 
individuals; therefore, they attempt to get utility of land even with insufficient 
land title. That also helped in growth of land mafia.  
(6) Priority of land owners have been changing. They prefer developing and 
selling land instead of cultivating the same. 
Land mafia, take benefit of such loose situation and exploit poor and weak land 
owners. They purchase share of the poor at very low rates, after attaining possessions, in 
most of the cases legalise their possession and sell it at higher price. This situation results 
in quarrels and chain of litigation. 
The transaction costs and other inefficiencies might lead to reduction of natural 
bargains, thereby, lead to inefficient allocation of resources, e.g. in Pakistan every lease 
agreement beyond one year must be registered and stamped leads to lessor and lessee 
agreeing a lease agreement of 11 months or stay unregistered [Alam (2006)]. This creates 
hidden economy as well as leaves rights unprotected in case of a conflict. Enforcement 
mechanism is weak, for instance a person executing unregistered legal instrument would 
be charged with only Rs 500 and the instrument would not be canceled thereto as well 
[Alam (2006)], which further suggests that it does not create a transaction cost to deter 
some bargains at all, while on the other hand mandatory registration requirements for any 
immovable property bargain is one such cost. Further, the complexities, cumbersomeness 
and documentation requirements over and above those which are of a particular law, 
creates the transactional inefficiencies.  
Contradicting legal practices also create a threat of rights violation to the bargainer 
as well as create the unidentified economic activity. The difference between the 
definition of a sale defined in Islamic Law differ slightly from the requirements of the 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 but in certain cases its more, e.g. in the case of law 
relating to pre-emption [Alam (2006)].  
In Pakistan, the Legal System2 is divided into customary, Islamic, and Official 
categories, each with its distinct legal traditions, and have developed their own clients 
and niches representing yet the distinct phases of the history of the region with no change 
in their proportions [ Chaudhry (2006)]. Vast majority of people live in rural areas which 
are predominantly ruled by customary/folk Islamic laws and not the official ones.  
2See Annexure 1 for definitions of legal institutions. 
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4.  IMPLICATIONS FOR LAND MANAGEMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL AREAS OF PAKISTAN 
Incompatibility of revenue laws, insufficient implementation mechanism and 
misinterpretation of laws have a number of implications. Many a time legally recognised 
relationships may not be substantially a part of economic relationships, and two 
categories of rights may not be co-extensive. Rules of game for determination of rights of 
individuals for marketable gains are required. Framing and implementation of rules draws 
its foundation on a governance system. For optimal governance, a legal regime must 
constitute a nested system of powers and authorities, so that it can adapt to changing 
circumstances, changes in institutional contexts and new scientific insights [Dietz, et al. 
(2003)].  
Weak Social System 
The existence of informal systems for deciding conflict (whether economic or 
else) and proportionate influences on formal as well as informal system has lead to 
limited success in social engineering aspect of formal law system in Pakistan [Azam 
(2006)]. Further the official system along with Islamic and customary laws are coherent 
with the local culture and are influenced by personal relations, ethnicity, money and 
influence customs.  
Crime 
Poverty, Income inequality, unemployment, low wages, weak law enforcement both 
from the quantity and quality aspect, weak institutions could be attributed to law breaching. 
Harrison and Gfroerer (1992) found that 26.1 percent of persons booked for any violent crime, 
and 24.7 percent of persons booked for any property crime used alcohol, cannabis and 
cocaine. Haq (2006) also analysed the impact of lawlessness on economic development using 
extended CGE model, and suggested that there is a two way causal relationship. 
In the present study data analysis shows that in Islamabad in a year total numbers 
of litigations registered in district courts are around 12,000. Out of these litigations 
revenue related are more than 8000 in a year. In addition, district revenue officers 
received more than five thousand (5000) complaints of minor nature dispute, frictions 
and anomalies based on incompatible revenue laws.   
Corruption  
Absence of clear, designated and transparent revenue laws increases complexities 
in the system. It enhances probability of using local discretion by respective official of 
government agencies. Use of discretion induces officials to seek rent in clumsy situation. 
This rent seeking culture increases in presence of more ambiguous laws. Ultimately, 
corruption in the society increases.  
“One of the biggest curses from which Sub-continent is suffering, I do not say that 
other countries are free from it, but, I think our condition is much worse, is bribery 
and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put it down with an iron hand.”  
(Quaid-i-Azam)  
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Corruption is defined as, “the abuse of public offices for private gains” [World 
Bank (1997)]. Corruption can affect resource allocation in two ways. First, it can change 
(mostly) private investors’ assessments of the relative merits of various investments. This 
influence follows from corruption-induced changes in the relative prices of goods and 
services, and of resources and factors of production, including entrepreneurial talent. 
Second, corruption can result in resource misallocation when the decisions on how public 
funds will be invested, or which private investments will be permitted, are made by a 
corrupt government agency. The misallocation follows from the possibility that a corrupt 
decision-maker will consider potential ‘corruption payments’ as one of the decision 
criterion [Aman and Ahmad (2006)]. 
Corruption has its multiple ramifications. In his supporting argument that Pakistan 
official system is plagued with corruption,  Chaudhry (2006) notes that often it has become 
our culture and routine, pointing out the moral deterioration of our society (selling, 
teaching, nepotism etc.) posing a question that ‘Is Corruption a moral deterioration, 
alteration from original,  the inability of the system to implement or a culture?’ 
The expansion of corruption in the decade of transition has coincided with a sharp, 
initial decline in output and significantly higher levels of poverty and inequality across 
the region [World Bank (2000)]. Aman and Ahmad (2006) are of the view that there is 
sufficient documentary evidence of considerable economic and social costs of corruption. 
Patwari is feeding many of his seniors on different occasions, for example hospitality of 
any VIP in the district becomes responsibility of Patwari.  
Corruption weakens public service delivery, misdirects public resources, and holds 
back the growth that is necessary to pull people out of poverty because it might be the 
poorest who is paying for it. As a result, some countries risk becoming trapped in a 
vicious circle in which pervasive corruption reduces public revenues, undermines public 
trust, and weakens the credibility of the state, unless decisive leadership can push through 
the necessary reforms. 
State Capture. It refers to the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the 
public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and 
other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-
transparent provision of private benefits to public officials. 
While state capture encodes advantages for particular individuals or groups in the 
basic legal or regulatory framework, administrative corruption refers to the intentional 
imposition of distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules, and 
regulations to provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit 
and non-transparent provision of private gains to public officials. 
Azfar (2006) notes that corruption has been shown to lead to lower investment, 
slower growth, misallocated resources, poorer health and education outcomes and more 
restrictions on international trade  thereby undermining the economic development.  
Several studies have demonstrated a relationship between corruption and income 
inequality. The theoretical foundations for this relationship are derived from rent theory 
and draw on the ideas of Susan (1978) and Kruger (1974), among others. Propositions 
include: (a) Corruption may create permanent distortions from which some groups or 
individuals can benefit more than others, (b) The distributional consequences of 
corruption are likely to be more severe when corruption is persistent.  
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Using the panel data of 71 developing and developed countries Aman and 
Ahmad (2006) found that the relationship between corruption and income equality is 
considerably negative. A central message of corruption and income inequality 
relationship suggest that corruption has significant distributional implications and, 
given its negative efficiency implications, should be considered harmful to both 
growth and equity. Therefore, policies that reduce corruption will also improve 
income distribution.  
5.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Implication of incompatible revenue laws are empirically observed and analysed. 
In this regard primary data is collected from district Islamabad. Data is described in 
Tables 1 and 2 for instance in Islamabad district only around eleven thousand cases were 
filed in civil courts during 2006. About 44 percent cases are based on incompatibility of 
land revenue laws. Ambiguity in laws leads to increase in civil litigation, thereby, cost to 
society increases.  
Table 1 
Annual Civil Cases in Islamabad  
Year  
Total Civil Nature 
Cases 
Land Dispute Based 
Cases 
Miscellaneous  
Cases 
2007 6,266 3726 Not Available 
2006 10,950 4,780 5,170 
Source: District Courts, Islamabad. 
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Table 2 
Annual Criminal Cases in Islamabad District  
Year  
Total Criminal Cases 
Registered 
Land Dispute 
Based Cases  Miscellaneous Cases 
2007 4487 1086 3401 
2006 4333 1065 3268 
Source: District Courts, Islamabad.    
Around 4487 criminal cases were registered during 2007. Share of incompatible 
land revenue law based cases in total criminal cases is around one fourth. Thus these 
ambiguous and old laws directly affects crime rate in the district. 
In addition to above categories of cases individuals also register their complaints 
in revenue administration/courts pertaining to land, their property rights and disputes. On 
average 52,000 per annum petitions/complaints are filed in Islamabad with respect to 
land related issues.   
6.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is observed that incompatible revenue laws directly affect civil litigation, crime 
rate and transaction cost in the society. Inconsistent laws increase work load on the 
governance institutions. Work load of civil and criminal courts also increases due to 
incompatible laws. Quality of service delivery and dispensation of justice is adversely 
affected by incompatible laws. Risk averse investors normally avoid making investment 
in such as ambiguous property right regime. Transaction cost to individuals and society 
increases with ambiguous laws.     
Even though the constitution provides the development goals and law plays an 
important role in the process of development, but a legal vision and strategy compatible 
with social and economic goals with micro-legal prescription (such as customary laws 
etc.) under a macro-legal framework is needed. Imposing formal institutional structures 
on a society with incompatible traditions is unlikely to succeed in bringing about lasting 
reform. Further the judicial system will lack legitimacy until the other instruments of 
national sovereignty also win citizen acceptance. 
Economic management of today needs to develop an interdisciplinary team, of 
economists and lawyers. 
On the constitutional front the law reform could include: 
(1) There needs to be an economic basis of laws relating to economic 
transactions. 
(2) Land revenue system including record keeping to be reformed. 
(3) Rationalisation of fee and structure of system. 
Owing to significant relationship of corruption to income inequality, policies 
aiming at reducing it would ultimately have a positive impact on the income inequality. A 
holistic approach with inclusion of public, private-corporate sector and civil society to 
address the issues of accountability, transparency, participation, openness and rule of law 
can help in combating such a situation. 
Thus, an effective anti-corruption strategy should:  
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(a) encourage the reduction of rents by means of economic liberalisation, 
deregulation, tax simplification, de-monopolisation and macroeconomic stability; (b) 
reduce discretion through administrative and civil service reform, including meritocratic 
recruitment and decentralisation; (c) honest and visible commitment by the leadership to 
the fight against corruption. The leadership must show zero tolerance for it; and (d) 
increase accountability—by building up institutions such as auditing and accountancy 
units, through legal reforms such as judicial strengthening, by encouraging public 
oversight through Parliament and a more vibrant civil society.  
With secured property rights openness to markets and reduced Inequalities in 
endowments and opportunities can play a large role in growth. There should be transition 
of land record system, backed by technical support by IFIs, such as the pilot project of 
digitisation of land use record in Rawalpindi district. Further in this regard all the sale 
deeds, land transfers and other land title changing should be through a solicitor, which 
can help in a legal and transparent manner preventing future legal recourses.  
ANNEXURE 1 
FORMS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
If legal institutions are socially taken into account as factual situations, their form 
must be such that they can actually be conceived of as particular situations. That is to say, 
as existent. There are three basis forms of particular situations: 
(1) The existence of a certain entity.  
(2) A certain existing entity having a certain property. 
(3) Certain existing entities having a certain connection. 
The category of entities can be further divided in two, namely subjects, which can 
perform acts, and objects, which can be acted upon. With the aid of both distinctions, a 
classification of particular situations and therefore also of legal institutions can be 
constructed. The idea is that this classification is exhaustive, because there are subjects 
and objects, which can only have a limited number of relations [Wessel (2001)]. 
The different kinds of legal institutions can be characterised as follows [Ruiter 
(1997, 2001, 2004)]: 
Legal Persons: A legal person is a valid legal regime with the form of an entity 
that can act. Example: the European Community. 
Legal Objects: A legal object is a valid legal regime with the form of an entity 
that can serve as the object of transactions. Example: a conveyable right of ownership. 
Legal Qualities: A legal quality is a valid legal regime with the form of a 
characteristic of a subject. The legal regime regulates the behavioral relation between that 
particular subject and all other subjects. Example: a person’s legal majority. 
Legal Status: A legal status is a valid legal regime with the form of a characteristic of 
an object. The legal regime regulates the behavioral relations between particular subjects 
responsible for that object and all others subjects. Example: a listed historical monument. 
Legal Connections: A personal legal connection is a valid legal regime with the 
form of a connection between subjects. The legal regime regulates the behavioral 
relations between those particular subjects. Example: a personal right. 
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Legal Configurations: A legal configuration is a valid legal regime with the form 
of a connection between objects. The legal regime regulates the behavioral relations 
between particular subjects with certain relations towards each of the objects. Example: 
an easement, that is, a legal regime with the form of a connection between a servient 
tenement and a dominant tenement consisting in a burden (e.g. a right of way) laid on the 
former for the benefit of the latter. All successive owners of the servient tenement are 
obligated to bear the burden and all successive owners of the dominant tenement are 
entitled to treat the former as thus obligated.  
ANNEXURE 2 
BUNDLE OF RIGHTS 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) describe five different property rights: 
(1) Access, the right to enter a defined physical property. 
(2) Withdrawal, the right to obtain the ‘products’ of a resource (e.g., catch fish, 
appropriate water, etc.). 
(3) Management, the right to regulate internal use patterns and to transform a 
resource by making improvements. 
(4) Exclusion, the right to determine who will have an access right, and how that 
right may be transferred. 
(5) Alienation, the right to sell or lease either or both of the above-mentioned 
collective-choice rights   
Bundles of Rights Associated with Types of Owners 
 
Owner Proprietor Authorised 
Claimant 
Authorised 
User 
Authorised           
Entrant 
Access x X x X X 
Withdrawal x X x X  
Management x X x   
Exclusion x X    
Alienation x     
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